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FEATURE: Impact ofKlaeren v. Lisle
IF IT AIN'T BROKE, Fix IT?:
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF AREN V LISLE
ON ILLINOIS ZONING LAW
By Victor P. Filippini, Jr., Barbara A. Adams, and
Elliot M. Regenstein*
When the Illinois Supreme Courtagreed to review the case ofPeopleex rel. Klaeren v. Village ofLisle,I
most observers expected the Court to clarify the
procedural rights associated with local public
hearings in Illinois. Although the Supreme Court
did address public hearing procedures, the more
BACKGROUND:
THE CASE AND TiE LAW
n Klaeren, landowners living adjacent to a
proposed Meijer development challenged
the procedure by which the Village of Lisle
approved the development. Specifically, Lisle
significant and startling
aspect of its decision
was the abandonment
of more than 40 years
ofprecedent through its
proclamation that
"municipalbodies actin
administrative or quasi-
judicial capacities when
those bodies conduct
zoning hearings
concerning a special
use petition." 2
Certainly, the
mere fact that a well-
established precedent
has been overturned is
... in filing suit, the
plaintiffs did not challenge
the substance of Lisle's
zoning decisions. Rather, the
basis for their zoning
challenge was that the public
hearing process did not
afford them an adequate
opportunity to be heard.
reason enough to take notice ofajudicial decision.
When that decision will literally affect every local
government in Illinois that has zoning authority,
and every property owner or developer who may
seek a special use permit in connection with the
use and development of a property, there is even
more reason to pay attention. But when such a
dramatic turnabout in the law occurs for no
apparent reason, it is time to do more than read
the Court's opinion; it is time to question it.
used the uncommon
procedure of a joint
hearing of its Zoning
Board ofAppeals, Plan
Commission, and
Board of Trustees on
the proposed develop-
ment to hear evidence
on the requested
annexation, annexation
agreement, rezoning,
and special use pennits
for a planned develop-
ment and for a gas
station. Over 500
people attended the
public hearing. The
mayor of Lisle presided at the hearing, allowing
the petitioners to make a full presentation of their
case but setting a two-minute time limit on all
* Victor P. Filippini, Jr. and Barbara A. Adams are part-
ners and Elliot M. Regenstein is an associate of the
Chicago office of Holland & Knight, LLC. They prin-
cipally practice in local government law and land use
law, representing many Chicago area municipalities and
governmental agencies.
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speakers from the audience - a limitation that
prevented a citizen group from making a prepared
presentation on behalf of 2,000 residents who
had signed a petition. The mayor also barred
citizens from presenting poster board exhibits as
evidence. Moreover, the mayor prohibited any
of the citizens from cross-examining any of the
petitioner's witnesses.'
After the joint hearing was adjourned,
the Plan Commission and Zoning Board of
Appeals each considered the evidence relating
to the requested planned development and gas
station special use permits, and both of these
bodies ultimately recommended that the special
use permits should be denied.4 Nevertheless,
the Village Board in Lisle decided not to follow
the recommendations of the Plan Commission
and Zoning Board of Appeals, and it approved
the annexation and zoning petitions needed to
permit the Meijer development to proceed.
The plaintiffs, disappointed residents of
Lisle, filed their lawsuit to prevent the Meijer
development from proceeding. The trial court
held a preliminary injunction hearing at which at
least ten witnesses testified to matters both within
and without the public hearing record. Following
the hearing, the trial court granted a preliminary
injunction from which the case was appealed.'
Significantly, in filing suit, the plaintiffs did not
challenge the substance of Lisle's zoning
decisions. Rather, the basis for their zoning
challenge was that the public hearing process did
not afford them an adequate opportunity to be
heard.6
In reviewing this case, the Appellate
Court of Illinois, Second District, held that the
procedures used at the public hearing in Lisle
violated the public hearing rights of the adjacent
landowners. In doing so, the Second District
determined that all public hearings "in all
municipalities" must allow not only the right of
cross-examination, but the "full panoply of rights"
to subpoena witnesses, present witnesses, and
request continuances for purposes of developing
rebuttal evidence.'
The Supreme Court expressly rejected
the Second District's conclusion that any public
hearing before any municipal body required the
municipal body to provide the full spectrum of
rights identified by the Second District. The
Supreme Court held that the Second District had
construed the phrase "public hearing" too
broadly.' The Supreme Court properly
distinguished between the process necessary at
"legislative" hearings and "quasi-judicial" or
adjudicative hearings, noting that quasi-judicial
hearings must provide certain procedures for
public participation not required for legislative
hearings.
It was the next step of the Court's
analysis that turned Illinois zoning law on its head.
The Court decided that, when considering special
use permits, the corporate authorities of
municipalities were acting in a quasi-judicial rather
than legislative capacity. 0 This overturned the
longstanding rule in Illinois that zoning decisions
of a local governing board are legislative.I' The
Supreme Court supported its decision that special
use permits are adjudicative hearings by noting
that "the property rights ofthe interested parties
are at issue."12 Of course, the same could be
said of nearly every zoning decision and many
other matters coming before municipalities,
including annexations (which do not ordinarily
require public hearings) and annexation
agreements. Thus, the Court's new litmus test
for distinguishing between legislative and
adjudicative decisions of a local governing body
is at best unclear, and will lead to many false
positives if applied as the Court directed."
Ironically, the Court's decision was
largely unnecessary for several reasons. First,
there is no constitutional requirement for a public
hearing in the zoning or annexation context.14
Thus, the only rights that the plaintiffs had were
the public hearing rights provided by statute. With
respect to the special use permits, the plaintiffs
received exactly the outcome they sought from
the hearing bodies: negative recommendations.
Moreover, the plaintiffs did not challenge the
substantive decision of the Village Board, only
the procedural process. Thus, the Court could
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have found this to be a case of "no harm, no
foul."
Second, even if the Court found that the
procedures that Lisle employed were so
fundamentally unfair that some redress was
required, the Court could have acted without
disturbing such longstanding precedent.
Specifically, the Court could have issued a narrow
decision that the procedures were so restrictive
that they failed to satisfy the statutory requirement
for a public hearing. This approach would have
addressed the perceived wrong with minimal
repercussions.
Third, even if the plaintiffs had objected
to the substantive grounds for issuing the special
use permits to Meijer, the Court did not have to
fashion a new remedy to address such objections.
Illinois courts long ago established that such
challenges can be brought to the circuit court for
a trial de novo to determine whether the decision
was arbitrary and unreasonable based on the so-
called "LaSalle factors."" This is a familiar and
well-understood remedy. In contrast, the Court's
ruling that the special use permit hearings in Lisle
were quasi-judicial raises unanswered questions
regarding the available judicial remedy. Illinois
law provides two methods of appealing
administrative decisions: the Administrative
Review Law and the common law writ of
certiorari.'6 The Illinois procedures under the
Administrative Review Law are not available
because the special use was not determined by a
final action of the zoning board of appeals."
There is also some doubt regarding the availability
of a common law writ of certiorari because
plaintiffs would seem to have the right to bring a
LaSalle factor-based declaratory action."
Moreover, in the Klaeren case, the plaintiffs did
not seek a writ of certiorari and the trial court
acted based on evidence outside the hearing
record, which is improper when proceeding
under a writ of certiorari.19
Despite the opportunity to decide the
dispute on much narrower grounds, the Court's
decision seemed to be fueled by the perception
of some commentators that a majority of other
states regard hearings on special uses as quasi-
judicial rather than legislative. 20 The Court
apparently accepted these commentaries without
regard to the existing statutory structure in Illinois.
For example, if the standard for adjudicative
hearings depends on whether the hearing affects
individual rights, then the zoning amendment
process that the General Assembly has created
is schizophrenic. Illinois courts have previously
ruled that amendments to zoning regulations are
generally applicable and do not affect any
particular property.21 On the other hand, there
As a result, special use and
other zoning hearings will likely
take on the character of "mini-
trials." This will necessarily
increase the complexity of the
hearing process.
can be little doubt that an amendment to a zoning
map with respect to a single parcel affects
individual property rights. Nevertheless, the
General Assembly has created a single hearing
process for both ofthese amendments, and such
process includes its own relief in the form of
protests and super-majority votes.22 Under the
Court's new view, a zoning amendment hearing
can conceivably be legislative or quasi-judicial.
This hardly seems to be the result anticipated, as
the General Assembly has not subjected the
amendment process (or the special use process)
to the Illinois Administrative Review Law, even
though it plainly has done so with other zoning
processes when deemed appropriate.
POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF KL4ERENAlthough it is too early to determine all of
the consequences from the Supreme
Court's decision inKlaeren, some initial
Continued on Page 27.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM OF THE
CHILD SUPPORT SYSTEM IN COOK COUNTY
By Malcolm Rich and Kristina Tunnicliff*
Statistics show that the State of Illinois hasone ofthe worst functioning child supportagen ies in the country. For example, in
2000, Illinois was collecting child support in only
16 percent of all cases, including those where
paternity and an order requiring payment of
support have not been established. The national
average is 42 percent. Also in 2000, Illinois
collected only 36 percent of current child support
owed. The national average is 56 percent.
But statistics tell only part ofthe story.
Legal assistance advocates, legislators and
government employees are bombarded with
complaints about the child support program.
Customer service remains an elusive concept and
too many parents - both mothers and fathers -
do not have confidence in the current system.
In October 2002, the Chicago Council
of Lawyers and Chicago Appleseed Fund for
Justice released a second report providing more
than 80 recommendations for change. In January
2003, Illinois legislation was signed into law that
would begin the process of implementing the
recommendations contained in the Council/
Chicago Appleseed Fund for Justice report.
During his successful 2002 gubernatorial
campaign, Governor Rod Blagojevich
emphasized the need for reform of the child
support system.
In this article, we discuss the
comprehensive research work and resulting
recommendations that have helped fuel the call
for reform of the child support system in Illinois.
RESEARCH INTO THE LmOIS CHILD
SUPPORT SYSTEM
he Council and Chicago Appleseed
began their work with child support in
1992 with a qualitative research study
aimed at the Cook County State's Attorney's
Division of Child Support Enforcement. A report
detailing the results of the study and
recommendations for improvement was released
in May 1996.1
After releasing this report, we recognized
that reforming one part of the child support system
would not be sufficient. We found that Illinois'
child support system was comprised of a
collection of uncoordinated activities being
conducted by at least five government bodies.
PUBLIC INTERESTLAW REPORTER
* Malcolm Rich is the Executive Director of the Chicago Appleseed Fund For Justice and the Chicago Council of
Lawyers. Kristina Tunnicliff is the Project Director of the Child Support Program of the Chicago Appleseed Fund
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Fixing one part of the system would not fix the
rest of the process.
In June 1996, the Chicago Council of
Lawyers brought together representatives from
19 government agencies, legal services providers,
and community groups involved in the Cook
County child support system for a series of
meetings. The goal ofthese meetings was to devise
solutions to improve Cook County's
exceptionally poor record in establishing,
enforcing, and collecting on child support orders.
This group was called the Child Support Panel
and was facilitated by former Illinois Supreme
Court Justice Seymour Simon.
After a year and a half of meetings, the
Child Support Panel produced a report, Child
Support in Cook County: A Model for
Improved Performance, which provides a
model for how the group believes the child
support system should function in Cook County.2
All participants in the Child Support Panel agreed
to support the basic structure and organizational
changes set out in the model.
Subsequently, Chicago Appleseed began
a research and advocacy project in September
2000. We interviewed and otherwise received
input from over 100 parents, lawyers, government
officials, and experts. We collected and analyzed
data from the child support programs in eleven
states outside of Illinois. We observed
courtrooms and hearing rooms at the Cook
County Circuit Court Domestic Relations Division
and the Expedited Child Support Division ofthe
Domestic Relations Division. As an innovative
approach to an otherwise sociological research
project, we also provided, legal representation,
counseling, and advice to custodial and non-
custodial parents on child support matters. This
allowed us to gain real world experience that
helped put our research into prospective.
OVERVIEW OF THE IV-D PROGRAMTitle IV-D of the Social Security Act
authorized the creation of state-operated
child support agencies, which are
commonly referred to as IV-D agencies. In
Illinois, the IV-D agency is housed in the Illinois
Department of Public Aid (IDPA). Any custodial
parent can apply for child support services from
IDPA. The services are free for welfare
recipients, and cost between $0 and $25 for those
not receiving welfare, depending on income level.
Child support services provided by IDPA include
locating missing non-resident parents, genetic
testing, child support order establishment,
enforcement, and modification, medical support,
wage withholding, computerized accounting and
billing, and interception of federal and state
income tax refunds.
IDPA contracts with several
organizations in Cook County in order to fulfill
its IV-D responsibilities. The Cook County
State's Attorney's Office acts as IDPA's legal
representative in child support matters, assisting
custodial parents in court with establishing
parentage, and obtaining, enforcing, and
modifying child support orders. The Cook
County Clerk of the Circuit Court assists judges
in child support courtrooms, handles customer
service, helps parents resolve financial and
accounting problems, maintains the docket, and
processes, disburses and keeps permanent
records of court ordered child support payments.
Maximus, Inc. is a private, for profit company
that contracts with IDPA in Cook County to
conduct reviews and modifications of child
support orders, follow up with income
withholding notices, calculate and adjust arrears,
perform customer service duties, draft petitions
for enforcement, and activities related to the
National Medical Support Notice (NMSN)
process. Other agencies that work with IDPA
so that it can carry out its IV-D responsibilities
include: the Cook County Sheriff's Office, the
Department of Employment Security, the Illinois
State Comptroller, the Internal Revenue Service,
the Department of Insurance and Professional
Regulation, the Illinois Department of Public
Health, the Illinois Department of Revenue, the
Continued on Page 31.
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SUPREME COURT TO DETERMINE THE FATE OF
AFFMATIVE ACTION IN EDUCATION
By Esther Choi
O n December 2, 2002, the SupremeCourt agreed to review the Universityof Michigan undergraduate and law
school cases, which will decide the fate of
affirmative action. The decision will either affirm
or reverse the Court's decision in the landmark
affirmative action case, Regents ofthe Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). The Court
in Bakke, found that diversity is a compelling
state interest. The Court also determined that as
long as race is used as one of many factors, such
affirmative action programs are constitutional in
order to create a diverse and dynamic
environment.
Hundreds of
groups and individuals
filed amicus curie briefs
both for and against
affirmative action
before the February 19,
2003 deadline.
Supporters of
affirmative action argue
that diversity is essential
to an academic en-
vironment, promoting
racial awareness.
Students' exposure to
different cultures and
races dispels prejudices and stereotypes and
promotes tolerance. Diversity also broadens the
learning process by providing a plethora of
perspectives. Advocates also argue that it is
necessary to yield leaders that reflect and fairly
represent the United States population. Goodwin
Liu, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: The
Diversity Rationale & The Compelling Interest
Test, 33 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 381,410-411
(1998). Virtually all 3500 institutions of higher
education agree that diversity is a compelling
interest. John Friedl, Making A Compelling Case
For Diversity In College Admissions, U. Pitt. L.
Rev., Fall 1999, at 28 (quoting On the
Importance of Diversity in Higher Education,
Chron. Of Higher Educ., Feb. 13, 1998, at A48).
More than 300 organizations represent-
ing academia, major corporations, labor unions
and nearly 30 of the nation's top former military
and civilian defense officials filed briefs in support
of affirmative action. Ethnic Majority, Groups
Support University of Michigan Affirmative
ActionCase, at http://www.ethnicmajority.com/
afinalive action news.
Companies
such as 3M, Coca-
Cola, Nike, United
Airlines, and General
Mills filed supporting
briefs as well. These
companies arguethat"it
is necessary to ensure
that members of all
segments ofour society
receive the education
and training they need
to become the leaders
oftomorrow." Sixty-
five companies with combined annual revenues
of more than $1 trillion stated the "future of
American business is on the line." FindLaw,
Affirmative Action Filings Flood Court, at
http://.news.findlaw.com/scripts/ scripts/
printerfriendly.pl?page=/ ap-stories/a/w/ 1153/
2-19-2003.
Many of the United States' best known
retired military officers and former top Pentagon
officials also filed a brief supporting affirmative
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action. Joe Reeder, a former Army
undersecretary, stated that diversity is "absolutely
essential to our fighting force..." FindLaw, Ex-
Officers Back Michigan Affirmative Action,
http://news.findlaw.com/scripts /scripts/
printer-friendly.pl?page-=/ap-stories/other/1 110/
2-17-2003.
Professor Diane C. Geraghty,
Constitutional Law Pmfessor at Loyola University
Chicago School of Law and Member of the
American Civil Liberties Union's National Board
of Directors commented on the importance of
diversity. "Diversity is critically important,
especially in an educational setting. This is
particularly true for the study of law. Law does
not develop in a vacuum. It is the product of
history, experience, functionality and values. The
ability of students to understand and critique law
and policy is enriched by the opportunity to learn
The Bush Administration
wants the Court to rule in favor
of "race neutralfactors, "such
as socio-economic status.
from others who bring a different set of
experiences and perspectives to the issue.
Equality of opportunity, of course, is important
in other settings, such as employment. But in the
education setting, the learning process itself
depends on the creation of the fuller context that
diversity allows."
There are three major arguments against
affirmative action. First, critics of affirmative
action argue that programs that give preference
to race unconstitutionally discriminate against
white applicants, creating a "reverse
discrimination." Second, opponents argue that
it actually hurts some minority students,
specifically those that have to compete in schools
they are not prepared for. Third, critics argue
that it perpetuates a stereotype and suspicion that
the minority students are unqualified, and are only
admitted because of their race. Newsweek,
What's At Stake, at http://stacks.msnbc.com/
news/861401.asp.
President George W. Bush told reporters
that he "strongly supports diversity of all kinds,
including racial diversity, but the method used by
the University ofMichigan was... fundamentally
flawed." CNN, Bush criticizes university
'quota system, ' at http://www.cnn.com /2003/
ALLPOLITICS/01/15/ bush.affinativeaction.
He stated however that, "We must be vigilant in
responding to prejudice wherever we find it... As
we work to address the wrongs of racial
prejudice, we must not use means that create
another wrong, and thus perpetuate our divisions."
FindLaw, Bush Opposes College on Race in
Supreme Court Case, at http://
news.fmdlaw.com/scripts/printer-friendly.pl?
page=/politics/s/20030116. The Bush
Administration wants the Court to rule in favor
of"race neutral factors," such as socio-economic
status.
The Center for Individual Rights and over
100 organizations are also opponents of
affirmative action. The organization believes that
"preferences are almost always unconstitutional
when used to achieve an arbitrary racial diversity;
they are only legal when narrowly tailored to
remedy past discrimination against identifiable
individuals." Center for Individual Rights, A
commitment to protecting civil rights, at http:/
/www.cir-usa.org/civilris _theme.html.
Ward Connerly, an African-American
chairman ofthe American Civil Rights Institute,
comments that "people are entitled to equal
treatment under the United States Constitution,
and affirmative action does not supercede that."
He further stated that, "it is important for
admissions officers to judge people as individuals,
not by the proportion of students of a particular
race at a university." The Digital Collegian,
Connerly speaks against affirmative action,
at http://www.collegian.psu.edu/archive/2003/
02/02-14-03tdc/02-14-03dnews-1 2.asp.
On December 13, 2000, the Sixth
Circuit found the University of Michigan's
Undergraduate admissions affirmative action
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program constitutional. On May 14, 2002, the
Sixth Circuit also found the University ofMichigan
Law School admissions program's use of race
constitutional. Since Bakke, the Supreme Court
has not granted petitions to review cases on
affimnative action in education.
The Supreme Court cases following
Bakke, support the principle that using racial
classifications are contrary to rights protected
under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
In May 1986, minority teachers were
given preference when they were protected
against layoffs because the school felt there was
a compelling need to have minority role models.
The Supreme Court held the school's policy of
extending preferential protection based on race
violated the Fourteenth Amendment. J5,gant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
In 1989, the city of Richmond required prime
contractors to subcontract 30 percent of their
contracts to "Minority Business Enterprises,"
particularly to African Americans, Asian
Americans and Latinos. The city felt these groups
were underrepresented, and wanted the city's
contracting scheme to reflect that ofthe minority
population of Richmond. The Court found that
the city failed to demonstrate a compelling
governmental interest ofremedying past wrongs
done specifically by the city. City ofRichmond
v. LA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
More recently, in 1996, a Texas census
revealed a population increase allowing three
more congressional seats in the House of
Representatives. Texas set up two African
American districts and one Latino, so the people
in these districts would elect minority
representatives. The Court found the state's
program that tracked race was evidence that race
was the predominant factor that motivated the
legislature to redistrict, and thus the redistricting
program was unconstitutional. The Court found
that based on race, the state denied the rights of
other citizens the opportunity to participate in the
political process. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952
(1996).
If the Supreme Court did not allow
enhancing diverse representation in the state
election process, it is unclear whether the Court
will continue to consider diversity in an educational
institution a compelling interest. The Supreme
Court essentially has three options. The Court
can affirm the Bakke decision, bar any use of
race in admissions programs, or narrowly tailor
their opinion to affect only the University of
Michigan's admissions system. Newsweek,
"If the Court's majority strikes
down the Michigan affirmative
action programs, it will send a
terrible signal to students ofcolor
that the highest court in the land
fails to recognize their historical
exclusion from institutions ofhigh
education and the contributions
they make to the educational
process. "
-Professor Diane C Geraghty,
Constitutional Law Professor,
Loyola University Chicago
School ofLaw and Member of
the American Civil Liberties
Union's National Board of
Directors
What's At Stake, at http://stacks.msnbc.com/
news/861401.asp.
Professor Geraghty commented on
whether the Supreme Court will find affirmative
action unconstitutional and the implications. "The
future of affirmative action in higher education as
we know it probably rests in the hands of Justice
O'Connor. Although she has voted to strike
down affirmative action programs in such areas
Continued on Page 35.
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